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The Case in Favor of US Nuclear Weapons
ROBERT G. SPULAK, JR.

From Parameters, Spring 1997, pp. 106-18.

As America searches for meaningful diplomatic and military policies to protect and promote its interests in the postCold War world, there are essentially two poles of opinion with regard to nuclear weapons. First, there is the post-Cold
War status quo, represented by the Clinton Administration's Nuclear Posture Review, conducted in 1993-94, which
recommended few and minor changes from Bush Administration policies. And, second, there is an earnest attempt to
delegitimize nuclear weapons by minimizing their role, their numbers, and their importance, spreading a kind of
nuclear stigma. Far from actually settling the United States' long-term future nuclear policy, the Nuclear Posture
Review was greeted with disappointment by those who had hoped to influence US nuclear policy in the latter
direction.[1]
The policies formulated under the Nuclear Posture Review were presented as a hedge against three concerns: the small
but real danger that reform in Russia might fail and a new nuclear-armed government might arise, hostile to the United
States; the slow pace of Russia's overall drawdown of nuclear weapons compared to that of the United States; and the
security of nuclear components and materials in the nuclear nations of the former Soviet Union.[2] These concerns
about an uncertain future, and about the Cold War legacy of 25,000 Russian nuclear weapons, led those engaged in the
Nuclear Posture Review to recommend that the United States retain flexibility by maintaining the portions of the
defense industrial base unique to nuclear weapons, ensuring sound stewardship for the nuclear stockpile, and ensuring
the ability to reconstitute the nuclear forces that are drawn down.
Among proponents of nuclear stigma, there is an overarching presumption that it would be a good thing if the world
could be made free of nuclear weapons, including our own. In contrast to the cautious recommendations of the Nuclear
Posture Review, policies of stigmatizing nuclear weapons are seen to be positive measures that can approach the ideal
of a nuclear-free world, despite our inability to put the genie back in the bottle. These pejorative perceptions of
nuclear weapons, should they prevail, would represent a shift in the attitudes of policymakers. Whereas most were
once convinced of the necessity of nuclear weapons to form the bedrock of strategic deterrence and to counter the
conventional might of the Warsaw Pact, the nuclear stigma philosophy is grounded in an optimistic academic debate
about nuclear weapons in a less threatening world.
The purpose of this article is to point out that the nuclear stigma philosophy lacks careful consideration of both the
risks and benefits associated with nuclear weapons. In fact, the true risks of nuclear weapons seem to be obscured at
the same time that the benefits are assumed to have all but disappeared. Any policy made without full recognition of
these risks and benefits is likely to have some serious unintended consequences.
Assessing Nuclear Danger
Nuclear stigma is an attempt to deal with the dangers associated with nuclear weapons. And indeed, there are many
such dangers: danger of all-out nuclear war, danger of unauthorized use, danger of loss of US power relative to
proliferating nations, danger of nuclear use by an irresponsible nuclear state, danger of accidental detonation. Although
these and other dangers vary widely in consequences, likelihood, and many other characteristics, discussions of
"reducing nuclear danger" tend to gather some or all of them under one heading and attempt to characterize them
collectively.[3] The policy recommendations to counter them usually include: sanctioning nuclear deterrence only
against nuclear attack on the United States; no reliance on nuclear weapons for international political purposes;
elimination of extended deterrence; an end to fissile material production; a comprehensive test ban; no strategic
defense (tactical missile defenses may be okay); much smaller weapon stockpiles and deployments; and no first use.
Authors typically appeal to the power of international institutions to guarantee security and to reduce and eventually

eliminate the need for nuclear weapons.
Some of these recommendations may be good, some may be bad, and some may be irrelevant to the actual dangers of
nuclear weapons. For example, although it is now unnecessary for the United States to produce more weapons-grade
fissile material, it is hard to make the case that the positive effect of a US fissile material production cutoff or a
comprehensive test ban is much more than symbolic or economic. Many of the recommendations to "reduce nuclear
danger" actually could work at cross purposes. One of the most worrisome proposals--for a minimal US strategic
stockpile--could actually interfere with nonproliferation[4] by withdrawing extended deterrence from nuclear-capable
allies who might then be motivated to develop their own nuclear deterrents. And although it's probably a minor
consideration, a comprehensive test ban might even interfere with the ability of existing or new nuclear states to
improve the safety of their weapons, increasing the likelihood of accidental detonation.
Insistence on minimizing the numbers of nuclear weapons provides a good illustration of the conceptual and analytical
problems related to stigmatizing nuclear weapons. Reducing the numbers of weapons might reduce the chances of
nuclear war and improve the overall safety and security of our nuclear arsenal--but then again, it might not.
Deterrence of war is one of the benefits of nuclear weapons discussed below; for now it is enough to assert that actions
that undermine the credibility of our deterrent may make nuclear war more, rather than less, likely in the long run.
Many of the other risks associated with nuclear weapons depend upon such aspects as the details of individual weapon
designs, the security of the facilities where they are stored, the operational requirements of their delivery systems, and
the design and integrity of the nuclear command and control system. If careful attention is not paid to all of these
factors, reducing the numbers will not necessarily reduce the real dangers associated with nuclear weapons. In fact, an
evident lack of interest in these kinds of nuclear issues at the highest levels in the US government could produce
consequences far more important--and far more dangerous--than the number of weapons or the amount of nuclear
material the United States possesses.
Further, a minimal stockpile, minimal deterrence, or a doctrine of defensive last resort intended to deter only the use
of nuclear weapons is not enough. In any war between major powers there is too great a possibility of unprecedented,
virtually terminal, devastation to civilization and mankind. The existence of nuclear weapons creates the risk of
catastrophe, but it also creates the only way to ameliorate that risk by minimizing the possibility of war between the
major powers. Nuclear weapons have this dual nature: they are the only possible solution to the problem they pose.[5]
Attempting to stigmatize nuclear weapons assigns a "nuclear danger" to our own weapons and activities on a par with
(or, when it comes to first use, greater than) the dangers we face from the nuclear weapons of our potential enemies.
For example, although there is no threat that the United States will become a proliferating nation (since it already has
nuclear weapons), the government has offered to place US fissile material under the supervision of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. The proponents of international supervision of US fissile material, or other cooperative
measures, will argue that the purpose is not to prevent the misuse of US resources, but to set an example for other
nations to make it easier to implement a regime that will help to lessen the chance of the misuse of their resources.
However, there is a clear implication that the trust that is missing when considering our own institutions is applied
instead, by some, to the notion that the world has become a safe place and that international institutions can guarantee
our security. The negative reactions of the public and Congress to placing US troops under United Nations command
and allowing other nations in a coalition or potential coalition to dictate US policy (with regard to the former
Yugoslavia, for example) are indicators why this transfer of trust may be unrealistic. The United States can use
international tools to promote peace, but cannot rely on them as it would rely on its own resources. The US nuclear
arsenal is our ultimate safeguard against the failure of those cooperative tools.
The policy of containment and strategies of deterrence, which depended upon a large and diverse nuclear stockpile,
served the United States well for more than 40 years. New policies developed to adapt to the end of the Cold War may
also have to last through good times and bad. Whatever strategic arsenal we construct and whatever policies for using
this arsenal we develop may have to serve not only for a time of reduced threats, but for future crises when the
existence of the United States may be threatened. We may be stuck with this arsenal, whether constructed carefully or
by default through minimization, and these policies, whether developed carefully or by default through stigmatization.
A senior Administration official expressed this view:

The United States is building down its nuclear weapons deployments and modifying related command,
control, and intelligence capabilities in response to budgetary and political pressures. It is not clear that
what remains is a coherent totality, after the work of the "termites." Elements have been "thrown
overboard" without a clear plan. . . . The [Nuclear Posture] Review must go beyond scenarios to justify the
arsenal . . . because there are no obvious scenarios that would suffice. It must also take into account that it
will cast a "20-year shadow" in terms of technology development, training, [and] decisions affecting the
nuclear industrial base.[6]
The essence of nuclear stigma is the elimination, minimization, or stigmatization of nuclear weapons, their
infrastructure, and the policies for their management, presumably leaving the minimum possible residual to contribute
to "danger." In the game of chess, when one contemplates a sequence of moves that involves capturing or exchanging
pieces, one always keeps in mind the maxim that "it isn't what you remove from the board that is important, but rather
what remains." We should decide which of the benefits of nuclear weapons are vital or important for the United States
and thoughtfully assess what is necessary to provide these benefits, including the ability to manage diverse risks far
into the future.
The Benefits of Nuclear Weapons
Since the beginning of the nuclear era, there has been great discussion and debate about the risks and benefits of
nuclear weapons. It is not my purpose to recreate that debate here, nor even to present a complete treatment of all the
alleged benefits of US nuclear weapons. It is necessary, however, to summarize briefly the principal arguments in
favor of US nuclear arms, since the proponents of nuclear stigmatization almost totally ignore them.
There are some who may be uncomfortable with ascribing benefits to weapons of mass destruction. However, these are
not simply benefits devoid of risks. There is, in fact, a competition of "alternate risks": the risks of various kinds that
arise from having nuclear weapons and the equally serious spectrum of risks that would result from not having nuclear
weapons. Possession of nuclear weapons creates benefits that can help to offset the risks of not having them.
Some argue that because of the collapse of the Soviet Union we cannot use history as any guide to the benefits of
nuclear weapons.[7] However, with the end of the Cold War neither the nature of the risks nor the nature of the
benefits has changed in any fundamental manner. The nature of the benefits of nuclear weapons depends on the
characteristics of the weapons themselves and on the need of the United States to have the capability to use force and
the threat of force to protect our interests in a world where other nations will always have nuclear weapons. Some very
important risks, such as the immediate risk of large-scale nuclear war, have indisputably declined in magnitude, at
least for a time. The balance between risks and benefits has shifted, allowing the changes that have already been
implemented in US nuclear posture, such as the withdrawal of most tactical weapons from Europe, the elimination of
aircraft standing alert, and the elimination of tactical weapons on US ships. But it does not follow that with the end of
the Cold War the benefits of nuclear weapons have therefore disappeared and that the United States has no need to
have the capability to use or threaten force to protect our interests. Before proceeding with truly revolutionary changes
in nuclear policy, any formulation should carefully balance both the risks and the benefits of nuclear weapons.
Possession of nuclear weapons by the United States has historically been very useful (even, some would say, vital to
the preservation of freedom in the world). Nuclear weapons are arguably the major reason why the second 45 years of
the 20th century did not witness the massive devastation of the world wars of the first 45 years. "The immense power
of nuclear weapons removed, long ago, any rational basis for a potential adversary believing that a major war could be
fought in Europe and won. . . . The value of nuclear weapons in such circumstances lies not in classical concepts of
war-fighting or war-winning, nor just in deterring the use of nuclear weapons in an adversary, but in actually
preventing war."[8]
Even those who emphasize other aspects of the historical superpower standoff must include nuclear deterrence high on
the list of factors. Nuclear deterrence does not ensure peace, but, short of nuclear war, places a limit on the level of
violence. In fact, among great powers the nuclear era has been a most peaceful time. Nuclear weapons appear to have
ended the terrible era of ever-more-devastating total war and substituted a relatively less-destructive era of limited
war. It was largely the United States' nuclear deterrent that prevented the Soviet Union from realizing the expansionist

ambitions it proclaimed to be its obligation as the vanguard of world communism.
Nuclear weapons are uniquely effective for deterrence because they are enormously destructive and can be delivered in
swift retaliation. No other military capability can duplicate the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. There have been
assertions that advanced, precision-guided, conventional weapons can perform the strategic missions of nuclear
weapons, but careful analysis shows this idea to be without merit.[9] Our nuclear arsenal is strategically sufficient: it
can destroy the sources of an enemy's economic, political, and military power. Precision conventional weapons cannot.
In addition, for effective deterrence, the image of a single aircraft bunker in the cross hairs of a guided bomb is no
match for the evocative image of a mushroom cloud. If we pretend that conventional weapons could be strategically
sufficient, we allow the credibility of our nuclear deterrent to be damaged.
The need for nuclear deterrence will not disappear. There are still powerful nations in the world which are potential
adversaries, both immediate and future. The interests of these other nations will, at times, be in conflict with the
interests of the United States. It is inevitable that another great power or a coalition of powers will arise to oppose the
hegemony of the United States. Although the Cold War is over, Russia still has the capability to destroy the United
States; the strong showing of the nationalists and communists in the Russian elections, the obvious failure of reforms,
the desire of Russia to be recognized as a great power, and replacement of the reformers in the Russian government
with officials from the communist era have refocused our concerns on this point. In a few years Japan, a Western
European state, or China could pose a strategic threat to our broad security interests; China is rapidly modernizing its
arsenal and could soon be a strategic nuclear threat. Since we will be cautious about attacking any nuclear power with
conventional forces, it will be difficult to deter even smaller nuclear powers such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq if our
nuclear threat to them is not credible.
Credibility is important for deterrence because the conditions under which the United States would actually use nuclear
weapons, and therefore the conditions under which nuclear deterrence even exists, depend on limitations we place on
ourselves. Credibility has been one of the most important aspects of nuclear policy from the beginning.[10] For
example, the lack of credibility of the US policy of massive retaliation led to the more limited US doctrines that were
then developed. The development of warfighting capabilities as a contribution to deterrence was based on the need to
demonstrate that there was a likelihood that nuclear weapons would actually be used. In addition, French perceptions
of the lack of credibility of the American nuclear guarantee led directly to the force de frappe. (Detargeting US and
Russian ICBMs would not have been acceptable if these weapons could not be retargeted quickly, because the lack of
verifiability would undermine the credibility of the ICBM forces.) Minimizing and stigmatizing our nuclear weapons
can create a self-imposed taboo with respect to even nuclear adversaries, thereby delegitimizing deterrence and
inviting threats to our interests.
This self-injury to our nuclear deterrence is not the delegitimization of all nuclear weapons that the proponents of
nuclear stigma hope for. It is neither reciprocal with our potential enemies nor permanent, even for ourselves.
Credible nuclear deterrence is robust, not delicate. Policies and actions that establish credibility couple with our
nuclear arsenal to create the possibility that in a war with the United States an enemy may face a risk of annihilation.
A potential enemy need not even be very rational to be deterred from actions that ensure his own destruction. (This is
not to argue for belligerence; we can keep the threshold for nuclear use high without undermining credibility.) This
creates extreme caution in the behavior of other states if they wish to threaten vital US security interests, and it
substantially reduces the likelihood of miscalculation.
Extended deterrence has been a cornerstone of both containment and nonproliferation. For example, NATO served to
extend the strategic commitment of the United States, including nuclear deterrence, to our European allies. Security
alliances also have discouraged some nations from developing their own nuclear capabilities by assuring them of
protection under the US nuclear umbrella. A policy intended to stigmatize or minimize nuclear weapons can weaken
nonproliferation and destabilize the security situation of our allies. As noted earlier, the lack of US nuclear credibility
led to an independent French nuclear force. Japan is another nuclear-capable ally we could place at risk if we allow the
credibility of our nuclear deterrence to erode visibly.
Another way in which nuclear deterrence is robust is that nuclear weapons are less sensitive to technical advances by

potential enemies, possibly reducing pressure for arms races. Advances in nuclear weapons by a potential adversary do
not necessarily decrease the effectiveness of our own. Advances in defenses, such as a ballistic missile defense or
improved submarine detection, may require adjustments to our deterrent forces, but since nuclear weapons are weapons
of mass destruction, their overall effectiveness does not depend on easily negated incremental advantages. (On the
other hand, a minimal stockpile of very few strategic weapons would become vulnerable to advances in defenses.) At
present stockpile levels, it is relatively easy for the United States to maintain a secure and effective second-strike
capability.
By virtue of their enormous destructive potential, the possession of nuclear weapons creates a quantum increase in
power and influence for the United States. Possession creates a threshold of antagonism which no nation can cross.
Global awareness of the existence of this threshold allows the United States to exercise influence without the threshold
ever being approached. Just as important, the opposite is also true: stigmatizing and minimizing our nuclear weapons
can undermine, to some extent, our international status and therefore our ability to influence world events and to
protect and promote our interests.
This is important because it matters which states exercise power in the world. (Suppose Nazi Germany had won World
War II or the Soviet Union had won the Cold War.) The collapse of the Soviet Union leaves the United States as the
only major power whose national identity is defined by a set of universal political and economic values.[11] Sustained
US power is central to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.
Some argue that economic strength alone can confer superpower status because economic powers can use trade and
economic policies to promote their economic welfare.[12] However, economic power is only one contributor to a
nation's overall power. The highest priorities of the United States government are to protect our central security
interests. Economic power alone cannot guarantee security; in fact, greater economic interests may extend the
boundaries of our security interests, thereby increasing our vulnerability to coercion or adding new opportunities for
others to try to influence US foreign policy. The greatest contribution of economic power to security is that economic
resources allow for the fielding of a formidable military force. This is why there is a great deal of concern over China's
economic growth: not primarily because of China's future ability to trade effectively (although this also may be of
great concern), but because of its rapid growth in military spending and the enormous resources potentially available
for its military. Even states that could not compete economically have been superpowers (e.g., the Soviet Union).
The possession of a robust nuclear arsenal confers real diplomatic advantages on the United States. It is a vital symbol
and part of the substance of our world leadership. Diplomacy is always performed against the backdrop of military
capability. In addition, nuclear weapons, and the threats they imply, can be used explicitly (although not without risk)
to protect US interests.[13] For example, during the superpower confrontation caused by the 1973 Arab-Israeli war,
increased US alert status, including nuclear forces, and hints of "incalculable consequences" probably helped to deter
Soviet intervention in Egypt. (Soviet nuclear capabilities also may have helped to motivate the United States to work
to prevent the destruction of the encircled Egyptian Third Army.) There has been widespread speculation that allusions
to nuclear use may have deterred Iraq from using chemical weapons in the 1990-91 Gulf War. And, the US carefully
refrained for several days from ruling out a nuclear strike against a Libyan underground chemical weapons facility to
increase the diplomatic pressure to stop construction.
Nuclear weapons make it easier for the United States to cooperate with other nations since they make it difficult for
other nations to threaten central US security interests. In the past, it has been very important in international relations
to avoid a relative gain by a partner in cooperation lest that relative gain translate into a shift in relative military power
that threatens one of the partners. This creates a barrier to cooperation in trade, economic policy, arms control, or other
activities that result in absolute economic or other gains. Nuclear weapons lower this barrier to cooperation.
On Nuclear Disarmament
Although nuclear stigma is usually presented as pragmatic, and sometimes includes only rhetorical speculation about
the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons, underlying disarmament motives often erupt as nonproliferation,
democratization, or wishful thinking, which to some extent may be interlinked.[14] The first form is the renewed
emphasis on nonproliferation. President Clinton, in his address to the United Nations, proclaimed: "I have made

nonproliferation one of our nation's highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all of our
relationships with the world's nations and institutions." A provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is that the
nuclear weapon states will make progress toward nuclear disarmament; at the time, the current Administration
appeared anxious to display apparent progress toward disarmament in response to this requirement of the NPT. The
fear of proliferation may be an important element in nuclear stigma. For example, this is the reason that one popular
recommendation to "reduce nuclear danger" is to end fissile material production. And, in fact, the US Secretary of
Energy hailed the end of plutonium production as "progress on the path of nuclear disarmament."[15]
In "Phase Out the Bomb," Barry Blechman and Cathleen Fisher express concern that "America's continued reliance on
nuclear weapons cripples its efforts to persuade others not to seek nuclear capabilities."[16] They quote General
Charles Horner, who stated, "It's kind of hard to say to North Korea, `You are a terrible people, you're developing a
nuclear weapon,' when the United States has thousands of them." (The real message to North Korea should be: "You
are acting like terrible people and that's why we can't let you develop a nuclear weapon.") As argued above, the
benefits of nuclear weapons depend on the characteristics of the weapons themselves and the need for the United
States to use force and the threat of force in a world where other nations will always have nuclear weapons. Thus,
rhetorical attempts to "delegitimize" US nuclear weapons will fail when confronted with reality, a dangerous fact that
will become obvious in the long run.
The second form of disarmament sentiment seems related to the announced US policy of enlargement, which seeks to
increase security by increasing the number of market-oriented democracies in the world.[17] This is an appeal to the
Kantian notion that liberal democracies will not go to war with each other.[18] The stigmatization of nuclear weapons
may be implicit here because some also believe that democracies "do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on
one another or threaten each other with"[19] or that "the `modernist' states reject not only the use of weapons of mass
destruction, but even the use of military force to settle their disputes."[20] Nuclear weapons are a critical problem for
this worldview because nuclear weapons are so powerful that even small nations with a few weapons could protect
their sovereignty and advance their interests without recourse to the cooperative measures that proponents of
democratization assume would become natural. Even in a cooperative world rogue states could not be prevented from
becoming nuclear powers without an extremely oppressive, intrusive, and totalitarian international regime, one that
could not be maintained even if it could be established. Because it would be much more comfortable to face a nuclear
rogue with nuclear weapons than without them, there would be a great deal of pressure for peaceful nations to rearm.
Whether or not a world full of mature democracies would be a peaceful world, a recent statistical analysis suggests
that states in transition to democracy become more aggressive and war-prone and do indeed fight wars with other
democracies.[21] This is a good analogy to our concerns about "reducing nuclear danger"; even if a world with zero
nuclear weapons would be a safer world, a United States in transition to fewer or zero nuclear weapons is not therefore
automatically a safer country.
A third form of disarmament sentiment is merely wishful thinking. McGeorge Bundy, William Crowe, and Sidney
Drell introduce their book, Reducing Nuclear Danger, with this statement:
From the beginning of the Cold War in 1946 to its end in 1990, the US government would have rejected
any offer from the gods to take all nuclear weapons off the table of international affairs. Today such an
offer would deserve instant acceptance; it would remove all kinds of risks of catastrophic destruction, and
it would leave us quite safe from Russian expansion. We should be free to enjoy two extraordinary
strategic advantages: first, as the least threatened of major states and second, as the one state with modern
conventional forces of unmatched quality. Unfortunately no one knows how to abolish nuclear weapons,
but the dramatic change in what we now need from these weapons makes a great difference in the limits
we can accept on the size and use of our nuclear forces, and that difference in turn affects what others can
decide.[22]
At first glance, the image created of a world without nuclear weapons appears attractive. But since this fantasy cannot
exist in reality, a point Bundy et al. readily admit, then it should not be used as any kind of guidance for the difficult
choices to be made in US nuclear policy. However, these distinguished authors nonetheless explicitly link their
considerations of the differences in US policy required by the end of the Cold War and their wish that nuclear

weapons didn't exist.
In the euphoria of greeting a New World, wishful thinking seems widespread. For example, Leslie Gelb, President of
the Council on Foreign Relations, recently wrote, "For a long time to come, Russia will be a second-tier country with
virtually useless nuclear arms."[23] In fact, Russia's nuclear weapons are no more or less useless than they were during
the Cold War. And Blechman and Fisher assert, "If all the world were modernist, nuclear weapons would have
absolutely no purpose and could already be safely eliminated."[24]
My point is certainly not to argue against encouraging nonproliferation and democracy. These favorable policies
generally serve the interests of the United States and most of the other nations of the world. But democracy and
nonproliferation are not primary means to achieve security. They can contribute to, but cannot be allowed to dominate
unquestioned, the true end of US nuclear policy, which is to provide for the security of the United States including
addressing the various risks related to nuclear weapons. The world in which all the great or nuclear powers are liberal
democracies does not exist and perhaps never will. It would be unwise to risk the existence of our nation on the fragile
notion that democracies will dictate international affairs and, consequently, exist in peaceful union. It is especially
unwise to allow wishful thinking to guide policy. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented; we will have to live with
them, perhaps forever. US nuclear weapons policy should not be constructed upon a mirage of disarmament sentiment.
Conclusions
There are many different kinds of danger associated with nuclear weapons, including the danger that policies which
minimize and stigmatize nuclear weapons may exacerbate old threats and introduce new threats to US security. All
choices involve risk. Stigmatizing all aspects of nuclear weapons may blind us to the extent that we overlook policies
that could actually reduce the danger of war or violence to the United States and the rest of the world. This concept
therefore interferes with our ability to formulate good policies to deal with national security and with the myriad issues
related to nuclear weapons.
Since we absolutely cannot achieve the goal of abolishing both nuclear weapons and the knowledge of how to
construct them, policies and actions that appear to move in that direction will always fail the test of plausibility. But
since these policies and actions would be undertaken in the name of "reducing nuclear danger," they acquire a
respectability that they have not earned through critical examination. This is the reason it is necessary to reject the
emotional appeal reflected in Les Aspin's assertion in 1992 that, in the new era, "the burden of proof is shifting toward
those who want to maintain" policies supporting US nuclear weapons and away from those who advocate "four
prescriptions of the left . . . a comprehensive test ban, an end to production of fissile material . . . removal of forwardbased tactical weapons, and renunciation of first use."[25] An assumption that the formulation of US security policy is
biased a priori toward a given set of policy recommendations is exactly the problem with nuclear stigma.
The benefits of US nuclear weapons support the argument that the elimination of our nuclear weapons would not be
good for the United States or for the world. These benefits include deterrence against attacks on our central security
interests, a contribution to the general prevention of war, extended deterrence that protects our allies and discourages
proliferation, security against technological surprise, maintenance of our superpower status, and the tangible benefits of
nuclear diplomacy.
This is not to say that there are no national security problems associated with US nuclear weapons. A serious
discussion that attempts to balance the dangers and benefits of nuclear weapons must be undertaken before
dramatically altering our security policy. Wishing that nuclear weapons didn't exist will not alter the security needs of
the United States or the associated nuclear problems. The United States needs to exercise wise leadership in
formulating its policies and in promoting and protecting its worldwide interests. Policies of minimizing and
stigmatizing the sources of our strength will only make it more difficult to lead.
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